Healthcare professionals require a unique knowledge base to function effectively during a hospital's response to a mass-casualty incident (MCI). A survey of 128 physicians, nurses, and emergency medical technicians involved in trauma care was conducted to assess their knowledge base and how it affected their decision-making in response to a MCI following a terrorist bombing. Three-quarters of the study group responded that ≥20% of the surviving victims were critically injured. Only half of the responders indicated that the main objective of medical management is identifying and treating patients with critical injuries. Forty percent of responders indicated that they would not triage a critically injured victim to immediate care. This survey indicates that further education in the principles of MCI management should be based on critical evaluation of the literature. 
Introduction
Terrorist bombings are common occurrences in many parts of the world. Planning for such events is essential in order to enable the medical community to respond effectively. Healthcare professionals working in hospitals responding to a mass-casualty incident (MCI) require a unique knowledge base in order to be able to make correct triage decisions. Most trauma healthcare professionals likely to respond to a terrorist bombing in the United States require additional education in the principles of MCI management.
Methods
A questionnaire (Appendix) was distributed to all students enrolled in a course on Hospital Response to MCIs conducted in the US [2005] [2006] . The same questionnaire was mailed to additional hospital-based trauma care providers in 2007. The questionnaires did not contain any identifiers. Survey participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and that the results of the survey would be pooled for presentation. Many MCI course participants incorrectly believed that a high proportion of critically injured patients would survive the explosion of a terrorist bombing attack. To determine whether this could influence triage and other medical decisions, respondents were stratified into two groups:
1. Group A-Those who believed that ≥20% of the survivors would be critically injured; 2. Group B-Those who believed that <20% of the survivors would be critically injured. Table 2 . Although this did not influence decision-making considerably, it appears to have influenced the number of those who would triage the critically injured patient in question 3 as expectant (Appendix). A subgroup analysis of the relationship between the main objective of medical management and the person most appropriate to perform triage in this scenario is in Table 3 . There was no consensus as to who should be in charge of triage (emergency department head nurse, 33%; emergency department head physician, 28%; senior trauma surgeon, 18%; senior emergency department or surgery resident, 19%). Only 16% of responders elected to transfer an elderly patient with generalized weakness to another hospital for evaluation. Only 7% thought that the secondary triage of mildly injured patients to other hospitals was appropriate.
Blast Injury
Seventy-two (58%) of 125 members of the study group responded that the basic medical history and physical
Perception of the Problem and Implications on the Contingency Plan
Overall, 74% of the responders incorrectly responded that data from previous MCIs indicated that at least 20% of surviving patients would have immediate, life-threatening injuries. Ninety-one percent of the responders indicated that missed injuries were frequent.
Only 64 (50%) of the 128 responders indicated that the main objective of medical management should be identifying severely injured victims. Forty-two percent of responders indicated that the main objective of medical providers is safety (decontamination or avoiding a "secondary hit" within the hospital). Seventy-five (60%) responded that during the initial phases, the use of diagnostic laboratory or imaging tests should be minimized, if not eliminated, while the casualty influx continues.
Fifty-two (41%) responded that they would not triage a critically injured victim to immediate care. Of these 52 respondents, 27 (52%) responded that they would triage a critically injured victim to expectant care. The answers offered by the 121 physicians, nurses, and emergency technicians who completed the survey and whose answers could triage a critically injured patient to immediate care. Half of these indicated that they would triage the severely injured victim to expectant care, therefore, not offering the victim any life-sustaining treatment. It should be emphasized that the patient described in question number 3 would not have been triaged to an expectant category in a non-MCI trauma scenario. The belief that ≥20% survivors suffer from lifethreatening injuries was related to a two-fold increase in the number of responders choosing expectant care for critically injured patients (Table 2 ). Failure to appropriately evaluate and treat a critically injured victim neither is correct nor ethical in most circumstances because the number of victims presenting who are in immediate danger after an MCI usually is small. 1 Questions 5, 7, and 8 dealt with perceptions related to injuries sustained following explosions (blast injuries) and their appropriate treatment. Experience with these injuries in the civilian sector is limited. 8 Most responders indicated that symptoms and signs were sufficient to exclude blast lung injury in non-critically injured victims, which corresponds with the experience of the authors. 2 The overwhelming majority of the victims of an explosion are not critically injured. Performing sophisticated tests in this patient population is an inappropriate use of scarce resources.
More than 80% of those responding indicated that the time necessary for observation to exclude blast lung injury was at least 12 hours. In practical terms, this would mean that all victims admitted following explosions should be hospitalized, which potentially would create a major burden for the admitting facility. Delayed development of respiratory failure following an explosion has been observed up to 48 hours following injury. 9, 10 However, this extreme case does not coincide with experience gained over the last two decades, in which thousands of victims were admitted following explosions. Most patients develop respiratory failure within minutes of the blast. 11 The longest latency period observed was three hours from the explosion to the onset of respiratory failure. This patient presented as one of the "walking" wounded, but had dyspnea and hemoptysis during his primary evaluation. Patient observation for 4-6 hours can safely exclude clinically significant blast lung injury. 2 More than 90% of the responders agreed that patients triaged as moderately injured commonly harbor immediate life-threatening injuries. However, there is little information in the literature documenting the incidence of missed lifethreatening injuries after a MCI. 3, 6 In a recent study of 604 victims of MCIs treated between 1995 and 2003, only three (4%) of the 78 critically injured victims were not identified following initial workup in the emergency department. 1 The secondary transfer of victims from one institution to another may be necessary whenever one medical instituexamination of patients are sufficient diagnostics to exclude unidentified blast lung injury, eliminating the need for more sophisticated tests. Seventy-six percent of responders indicated that victims exposed to explosions should be kept under observation for at least 12 hours.
Discussion
Defining the main objective of medical management is crucial in developing a contingency plan for MCIs. 1 Only half of those surveyed indicated that the main objective of the hospital staff after a MCI is the rapid identification of critically injured patients. Only rapid identification and treatment of critically injured patients can reduce the critical mortality rate. The critical mortality rate is the mortality rate of critically injured patients (immediate care patients) after a MCI. The critical mortality rate, not the overall mortality rate, is a key indicator of quality of care after a MCI.
Safety is a major focus of training for emergency personnel. Many respondents elected decontamination and prevention of a "second-hit" as the most important objective of the response. The importance of decontamination after a conventional explosion is unknown. An explosion targeting medical and rescue personnel by a second suicide bomber, has occurred (e.g., Beit Lid suicide bombing in January 1995). 2 Suicide bombers have targeted hospitals in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel. All contingency plans should have a protocol to avoid such a possibility. Safety within the hospital should be the primary responsibility of the security forces, allowing the medical personnel to concentrate on the medical workup and treatment of the victims.
Some authors recommend that the most experienced trauma surgeon should be in charge of triage. 3, 4 However, this approach may not be best, since it often precludes the involvement of the most experienced surgeon in the treatment of victims with life-threatening injuries. 1 Most of the survey responders indicated that medical personnel other than the most experienced trauma surgeon can be trusted with this responsibility, regardless of their opinion regarding the main objective of the medical response.
Scarce resources should not be allocated to patients with a low probability of survival if the number of critically injured is overwhelming. Stein and Hirshberg suggested "minimal acceptable care" whenever approaching a critically injured victim during the initial phases of a MCI. 5 This term has received various interpretations, ranging from withholding appropriate workup to withholding appropriate treatment during the initial phases of the MCI. 6, 7 Most of the survey responders indicated that the use of diagnostic laboratory or imaging tests should be minimized, if not eliminated while casualty influx continues (question 9). Four out of 10 responders indicated that they would not The questionnaire used in this study addressed practical issues that incident commanders face during a MCI due to a terrorist bombing: Who should be in charge of triage? Should a victim in extremis be treated or not? How should blast injury be excluded? Which patients should be transferred to other medical facilities? The "correct" answers to these questions are based on the published literature and the extensive experience of the authors. This expert opinion is the best information currently available, but is a limitation to this study.
Conclusions
Three-quarters of the trauma care health professionals surveyed wrongly believed that at least 20% of victims surviving a terrorist bomb attack would have critical injuries. Fifty percent of the survey respondents believed that the identification and treatment of critically injured patients was the highest priority. Forty percent of responders would not triage critically injured patients to immediate care. Further education in the principles of MCI management should be based on critical evaluation of the available literature.
tion is overwhelmed by a large number of severely and moderately injured victims. The goal is to convert a masscasualty event in the field to a multiple-casualty event for each hospital. Most responders agreed that there was no place for the secondary transfer of mildly injured victims. Emphasis should be given to the secondary transfer of severely injured victims following primary stabilization who need specialized treatment not available in the admitting institution. The secondary transfer of moderately injured victims who require operative interventions should be considered if surgical resources are overwhelmed by more urgent cases. 6 Explosions directed at civilian targets are a major tool of terrorists. Prospective clinical trials of treating terrorist bombings victims are impossible due to the random occurrence of these events. Most published articles are descriptive accounts of individual events. The recommendations offered are based primarily on expert opinions.
